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Abbreviations and Glossary of Key Burmese Terms 
 
ABPO All-Burma Peasants’ Organisation 
ABTUC All-Burma Trade Union Congress 
ABWFL All-Burma Women’s Freedom League 
AFPFL Anti-Fascist Peoples’ Freedom League 
Ahpwechok1 Federation 
Ayeidawpon2 Revolution 
AITUC All-India Trade Union Congress 
ARO Asian Relations Organisation 
AS Bogyoke Aung San 
ASC Asian Socialist Conference 
ASM Asia Socialist Movement 
Athin                                                   Association or Organisation 
AUMP Auxiliary Union of Military Police 
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation 
BBTCL Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Ltd. 
BIA Burma Independence Army 
BRP3 Burma Revolutionary Party  
BSP Burma Socialist Party 
BSPP Burma Socialist Program Party 
Bama Taw-hlan-hmu Burma's Revolution 
Ba La Ma Sa4  Burma Women’s Freedom Asiayone 
Ba Ta La Sa5  Burma Taungthulaithemar (Peasants’) Asiayone 
Bogyoke  General (usually used of Aung San) 
BWPP Burma Workers’ and Peasants’ Party 
CPB  Communist Party (Burma) 
Clean AFPFL  The faction led by U Nu, Thakin Tin and Thakin
 Kyaw Tun when the AFPFL was split into two 
DP Dictatorship of the Proletariat 
DSO Democratic Students’ Organisation 
Daw "Mrs": respectful title for Burmese married women 
FTOB Federation of Trade Organisation (Burma) 
GCBA General Council of Burmese Association 
HMG His/Her Majesty’s Government 
Hsoshelit Wada Socialism 
ICS Indian Civil Servant 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
INA India National Army 
INC                                                     Indian National Congress 
                                                 
1. Pa Sa Pa La Ahpwechok (AFPFL)= Ah Myo Thar Democracy Ahpwechok (NLD) 
2. Saya San's Taungthulaithamar (Peasant's) Ayeidawpon = 1300 (1938-39) Ayeidawpon 
3. Also known as the Peoples' Revolutionary Party. 
4. Also known as the "All-Burma Women’s Freedom League".  
5. Also known as the "All-Burma Peasant's Organisation".  
 
 ii
IOR India Office Records 
IUSY International Union of Socialist Youth 
Kayars Ethnic group, also known as Karenni 
Keibotai Civil Defence 
KMT Koumintang  
KNDO Karen National Defence Organisation 
Lokaneiban Paradise = Perfect World, the ultimate aim of 
Burmese Socialist programs 
LUC Leftist Unity Council 
Lanzin Program (Directive) 
Mah title used in front of the name of Ethnic Karen (like 
Mr.) 
MI Military Intelligence 
Marxist League (ML) The organisation including those who emphatically 
believed in the ideology of Karl Marx, "Marxism" 
MP Member of Parliament 
NLD National League for Democracy 
NUF National United Front (in Burmese: y r n w) 
NW Ne Win 
Nga Pu  Short person (dwarf) 
PFP Peoples’ Freedom (Socialist) Party 
PKI                                                     Partai Komunis Indonesia 
PRC People's Republic of China 
PRP Peoples’ Revolutionary Party 
PSP Praja Socialist Party 
PVO Peoples’ Volunteer Organisation 
Politbureau The group holding supreme power in CPB 
Presidium The group holding supreme power in BSP 
Pha Ta6 Pa La Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League 
Pha Sa7 Pa La Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League 
Rakhine Ethnic Arakenese 
Red Flag Communist Party  The party led by Thakin Soe that split from the CPB 
in the 2nd CPB Congress on 20th July, 1945 
SEAC                                                  South East Asia Command 
SEATO                                               South-East Asia Treaty Organization 
SOE Special Operation Executive 
Sinyethar  Proletariat 
SI Socialist International (Second International) 
SLORC State Law & Order Restoration Council 
Stable AFPFL The BSP group led by U Ba Swe and U Kyaw 
Nyein when the AFPFL was split into two 
SOAS  School of Oriental and African Studies 
Tat (Tatmadaw) Army 
TUCB Trade Union Congress (Burma) 
                                                 
6. "Ta" means "attack and destroy". It is softer in sense than "Sa". 
7. "Sa" means "oppose or be against".  
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Thakins "Lords" or "Masters" 
Taline Ethnic Mon 
TA & DA Travel Allowance and Daily Allowance 
U "Mr": respectful title for an older Burmese man 
UF  United Front (Vanguard of the Revolution) 
UN United Nations 
UHRC University of Historical Research Commission 
Wunthanu Nationalist 
White Flag Communist Party The core of the CPB, led by Thakin Thein Pe and 
Thakin Than Tun, that remained after Thakin Soe 
and his followers split and formed their own Burma 
Communist Party. 
WFTU World Federation of Trade Unions 
YMBA Young Men’s Buddhist Association 
Yebaws Comrades 
Zayat  Rest-House 
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Abstract 
 
This dissertation seeks to demonstrate the legacy and historical significance of the 
Burma Socialist Party (BSP), and so, to solve major puzzles for scholars of Burmese 
history, particularly with regard to how the links between civilian and military groups in 
politics in Burma came about. Thus, this thesis addresses a major gap in the current 
historical literature, which has tended to underplay or ignore the role of the BSP. In so 
doing this work draws a wide range of interviews, archives and hitherto unused research 
sources, as well as the historical analyses in English and Burmese contribute.  
 
The thesis begins by examining the historical and cultural antecedents of the BSP. 
The party was formed as a major element of Burma’s independence movement, which 
developed from a core group of nationalist leaders. Among these leaders were founders 
and key members of the future BSP. The Peoples’ Revolutionary Party (PRP), the pre-
war version of the BSP, emerged in the struggle for independence and played a key role 
in that struggle as a core group around which the future state was founded. After the War, 
the BSP came out as separate party to compete with the Communist Party of Burma 
(CPB). The Tatmadaw played a key role in this process, and thus the process itself was a 
crucial turning point in Burma’s history. 
 
The BSP was the main political party after Burma’s independence in 1948. This 
situation can be seen through looking at the way the Anti-Fascist Peoples’ Freedom 
League (AFPFL) operated as the umbrella of the BSP. The BSP shaped domestic and 
foreign policies in the period 1948-58, and provided the basis of various forms of 
government, even at times of internal division. It was in these circumstances that the 
military aspect of Burmese politics became important. Careful examination of the sources 
dealing with the major political influences of the post-independence period shows that the 
Burmese military took their ideas from the BSP and launched their bid for power by 
taking over from the BSP. 
 
 
 xi
Introduction 
 
Why, in the period after the fall of the Soviet Empire, should I write a 
dissertation on the Burma Socialist Party (BSP)? The end of the USSR coincided with 
the dissolution of the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP), a party which had been 
formed on 4 July 1962 and whose rule had lasted from 1962 to 1988. In its initial 
form the BSPP was a Revolutionary Council (RC) led by progressive military minds 
who had staged a coup. That reflected earlier preparation for a socialist program after 
1958 to transform the state from a parliamentary to a socialist system. The BSPP had 
links to the BSP, which evolved between 1945 and 1964, and which had existed in 
earlier forms since 1939. Such links have rarely been made public. This thesis will fill 
the gaps in the Burmese literature on the subject, but more than this, the 
historiography appears to have important omissions and distortions. The gaps in the 
literature highlight the importance of the central question of this thesis: “To what 
extent has the BSP been the central force in modern Burma/Myanmar history”.  
In order to answer this question, I will first describe how I researched this topic 
because it shows the links between personal experience and the uses of existing 
scholarship. Next, I will look at the early history of the BSP, identifying key 
personnel, and their influence and memories. This leads into an evaluation and 
discussion of the English language scholarly literature on the history of politics in 
Burma/Myanmar. I then discuss which methods were used in this thesis. Finally, I 
provide an outline of the thesis as a whole, briefly describing each chapter.  
 The importance of addressing these historical gaps and central argument the 
thesis makes is related to the advantages of writing this thesis in Australia. I have 
previously worked in the History Department of Rangoon University and of Taunggyi 
Degree College from 1986 to 1991 as a Tutor. This teaching job was abolished 
because of my participation in the 1988 democracy movement.1 In 1993, I completed 
                                                 
1. The 1988 democracy movement was initiated by the students’ movement. Amongst the causes of the 
movement was the peoples’ suffering, a result of the BSPP government’s de-monetisation of large 
currency notes in September 1987. The students’ movement began in March 1988 at the Rangoon 
Institute of Technology, and then spread to other campuses in June, leading to the closing of all 
universities. In August, there was a general strike not only in Rangoon but also in other cities. 
Consequently, there were leadership changes in the ruling BSPP and eventually, General Saw Maung 
seized power in September 1988. As a result of military and police actions against students’ and 
workers’ demonstrations, many people were killed during this period. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi viewed 
the peoples’ demonstrations at night as wrong. The event happened in 1988, therefore, was known as 
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my Master thesis on The Peoples’ Freedom (Socialist) Party (1944-1948), the party 
that preceded the BSP. I was fortunate, in that family connections allowed me to gain 
access to special sources for my research. The former BSP Chairman, U Ko Ko Gyi, 
was my grandfather, and U Hla Mon, a Senior Tutor from the History Department at 
Rangoon University, my grandfather’s cousin, had worked as his personal bodyguard. 
The impetus to research the BSP came from U Hla Mon’s many stories about his 
experiences as bodyguard.  
When U Ko Ko Gyi died on 5 August 1992, his obituary notice in Burma’s two 
newspapers, "Myanmarahlin" (-refrmhtvif;), and the Working Peoples’ Daily, was 
censored. Why was he the subject of so much high-level attention? Was the attempt to 
omit him from history related to General Ne Win’s legacy, or an attempt to suppress 
any mention of the BSP because of its former members’ involvement in the National 
League for Democracy (NLD)? There were many ex-members of the BSP of 1948-
1964 in the NLD, including U Aung Shwe (ex-army who became NLD chairman), 
Thakin Soe Myint, U Hla Pe, U Than Tun and the late U Chit Khine (ex-army). Or 
was this part of a post-Cold War attempt to remove any mention of socialism from the 
public face of Burma? It was clear to me from this sensitivity just how important the 
history of the BSP was to an understanding of the current situation in Burma. Both the 
opposition and the Tatmadaw government consider it necessary to advocate National 
Reconciliation (as it is called by the Opposition) or National Reconsolidation (the 
term preferred by the Government) in the current unfinished approach to exercising 
state power. A common ground in the approach of both sides can be found in the roles 
played by civilians and the military in the freedom movement of the first part of the 
twentieth century.  
 
Literature on the Subject 
There is a wide literature on the history of politics in Burma but as with other 
postcolonial literatures, it excludes important elements and does not draw important 
conclusions. The weakness of much of the current literature about the BSP is that it is 
based on secondary sources and the views of outsiders. Only if one understands the 
nucleus of Socialists’ participation in the nationalist movement and subsequently the 
                                                                                                                                           
“Democracy movement” or “Democracy Ayeidawpon (revolution)”. See for example, the Ex-President 
of Burma/Myanmar Dr Maung Maung in his last work, titled the event as “1988 Uprising in Burma”. 
See also the 1988 democracy movement of Burma in Vince Boudreau, Resisting Dictatorship: 
Repression and Protest in Southeast Asia, Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2004.       
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parliamentary system of Burma, can one clearly understands the characteristics of 
Burmese politics in the later phase of the Socialist revolutionary struggle over three 
decades, and current competition over state power between the ruling military 
government and civilian groups. That is a central conclusion of this thesis. Some 
scholars may argue that the BSP was only incidental to Burmese history. On the other 
hand, there is also significant evidence suggesting an alternative view, and that is 
what I aim to investigate here.  
A political party is defined generally as an organization, an association, a group, 
a type of social relationship. Maurice Duverger defined a party as “a community with 
a particular purpose” . Yet he elaborated that a political party is “…not a community 
but a collection of communities…”.2 In fact, the meaning of “a collection of 
communities” is not a comprehensive statement of the basis of a political party. In 
every society with a state, there is a variety of communities which are not directly 
associated with political power but only with the affairs of that community, such as a 
religious group. Therefore, a political party is a group of leading individuals and 
members who share common aims, principles and ideology, whose intention is to 
improve the welfare of all who are live in the state or of specific members, linked 
directly or indirectly to exercising state power. In other words, the aim of a political 
party is to attain political power directly or indirectly, in order that it can implement 
its objectives within society, according to the local environmental and international 
circumstances.  
The general function of parties is to be the representatives or brokers, for the 
collective membership, a mixture of society; to unite the people, the cautious 
response, the convincing acts, the repressive moods, the selection of leaders, the 
policy-makers, a representation of the government.3 Some parties persuade the 
masses  to directly seize state power but some do not. There is a bi-party system in 
Britain or the United States and people living in Australia usually concentrate on tw
parties- the Labor Party and Liberal Party although there is potential for a multi-party 
system. Burma’s two neighbouring countries exhibit different systems. In the east is
China with a single party system controlled by the Chinese Communist Party since 
o 
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1949, to the west, the Indian party system has been dominated by the Indian National 
Congress (INC) since 1885. 
                                                
Burma was incorporated into the British-India Empire in 1886 after waging 
three Anglo-Burmese Wars. However, the INC in its early years was against the 
annexation of upper Burma. 4 There was native resistance to alien rule after the 
annexation of the whole of Burma. One source reveals that there were altogether 
ninety-six parties, organisations, groups and fronts in the development of the Burmese 
party system from 1906 to 1962.5 This number includes both legal and illegal parties 
and organizations which emerged at that period. However, another source assessed 
the Burmese party movements for the period of 1950-1962 focussing on four parties, 
based on activities around the “government of nation-states”.6 The second study took 
the approach that a party can be defined by how it evolved to representations of  
government organised within the state. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
start of a ‘national ray’ began with the appearance of religious organisations such as 
the Young Men’s Buddhist Association (1906) in Burma like the Budi Utomo (1908) 
in Indonesia.  
Like the Indonesian Sarekat Islam (1912), the Burmese national political 
organisation took a western form; with a chairman, vice-chairman, treasurer and EC 
members. The General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA) emerged in 1919.7 
In the 1920s, the distinguished political groups accepting the British Constitutional 
reform of 1923 were the Golden Valley Group led by Sir Maung Gyi and the Twenty-
one Party led by U Ba Pe. On the other hand, the groups against the reform were the 
Party led by U Pu who later became Premier in 1939, U Paw Tun’s Party in which Dr 
Ba Maw (who later cooperated with Thakins group in 1930s) was involved, U Chit 
 
4. Basudeo Sharma & Miss Manju Jain, “The Rise and Growth of the Indian National Congress: Ram 
Pande, Congress 100 Years, Jaipur: Jaipur Publishing House, 1985, pp.26-30; M. V. Ramana Rao, A 
Short History of The Indian National Congress, Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1959, p.8. The first Indian 
National Congress was held from 28 to 30 December 1885 in Bombay in which one of its nine 
resolutions was that “protest against the annexation of upper Burma”.  
5. Robert H. Taylor, "Burma": Haruhiro Fukui (Editor-in-Chief), Political Parties Of Asia and the 
Pacific, Westport Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985, pp.99-154. It was noted about ninety-nine parties, 
organisations and fronts varied from political, unity, ethnicity, religion and socio-politics. He presented 
not only legal but also illegal parties, but he did not count mass organizations. However, I excluded of 
three parties which were emerged only after formation of the BSPP (1962).  
6. Kenneth Janda, A Conceptual Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Political Parties, 
California: Sage Publications, 1970, p.118: Appendix.  
7. Pauker, “The Role of Political Organisations in Indonesia”, pp.129-142.   
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Hlaing’s Party and the Party led by U Soe Thein.8 All these parties or groups had 
sprung up in the political era of GCBA and were shadowed by the nationalist 
movements of the INC. The 1920s political generation were not willing to request full 
independence for Burma and were satisfied with participation in the legislative 
administration. They all continued to be active in response to the question of whether 
to separate from India or not, and in the election of 1936 following the Government 
Act of 1935. At last, Burma was separated from India.  
Unlike the gradualist political environment of the 1920s, the next decade saw 
dynamic political development beginning with the emergences of the Dobama 
Asiayone and the All Burma Youth League in which Ko Nu participated, (who was 
later involved in the 1939 pre-war BSP inner circle).9 In the 1930s, the Burmese 
political environment was influenced by the Asiayone in the place of GCBA, although 
the groups from 1920s were still involved in the Constitutional reform. The 
University Students’ union clique which came into the limelight after the Second 
Students’ Strike of 1935-36; it coincided with the Asiayone in 1936 and evolved to 
some extent into the structure of a mass party with branches in every district or 
town.10 The result of the 1936 election was the formation of the parliamentary wing 
of Dobama, the Komin Kochin Party in which Thakin Mya was involved (who was 
later became a central leader of the pre-war BSP) and the Fabian Party led by Dedok
U Ba Cho (who after the War became a chairman for a wing of the BSP, the Workers
Asiayone).
e 
’ 
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national united front in September 1939.13 The intention of the group was to follow 
the Constitutional reform and recognise Dr Ba Maw as their head. On the other hand, 
in November 1939 they formed a central group, employing the English political term 
“caucus”, known as the “Underground Party”, with Thakin Mya as its head, in 
preparing for armed struggle to achieve Independence.14 The nationalist movements 
of 1930s were more active than in the 1920s. The later generation saw the former as 
“corrupt politicians” around the Legislative Council but at last they had chosen Dr Ba 
Maw as their leader to gain recognition outside Burma. However, their real leader 
from the inner circle was Thakin Mya.15 The momentum of the movements sharply 
increased pressure for Independence from home rule with the welding of the 
intellectual class with the students’ union group to the thakins group in 1936. 
Only after they had constructed a coalition from three groups—the Burma 
Army (Tatmadaw), the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and the Peoples’ 
Revolutionary Party (PRP)—could they challenge colonialism and Japanese fascism 
through the national front, the Anti Fascist Organisation (AFO), later known as Anti 
Fascist Peoples’ Freedom League (AFPFL). There was a split of Communists’ 
leadership into two; the CPB led by Thakin Than Tun, and the BCP led by Thakin 
Soe after the emergence of separate parties - the Communist Party of Burma in May 
1945 and the Socialist Party of Burma in early August 1945. Another para-military 
force, the Peoples’ Volunteer Organisation (PVO) emerged in December 1945. In 
post-war politics, the political elite of pre-war period such as Dr Ba Maw, U Chit 
Hlaing, Myat Thar Tun, Sir Paw Tun, and U Saw attempted to revive their parties 
including the Dobama Asiayone with public support in 1920s and the 1930s.16  
However, U Aung San who entered politics from military service and his 
AFPFL against the Fascists emerged into the public limelight, so that the old 
politicians and their parties were not able to get much public recognition. The AFPFL 
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itself was persuaded to include all kinds of people and parties, and thus, the old 
veterans - U Ba Pe and Henzada U Mya from U Saw’s Myochit Party, becoming 
influential members of the League.17 The British Governors saw an opportunity and 
used Thakin Ba Sein and U Saw as a counter-balance to the League.18  
After regaining independence in 1948, there were splits among the nationalist 
groups and the result was Burma’s civil war. The main force in the AFPFL, which 
was to become the BSP, linked civilian and military groups with the so-called 
“Yellow” Peoples’ Volunteer Organisation (PVO) force and other nationalists, to 
overcome the CPB and ethnic revolts. The rest of the PVO, “the whites”, had gone 
underground in 1948 after a split. The BSP thus appeared crucial to the maintenance 
of the sovereignty of the Union of Burma. As a result of ‘Cold War Politics’, the 
Burmese Socialists had a major split in 1950 provoked by the Korean War (1950-52). 
Thus, it was moving to form a new opposition group in parliament under the AFPFL 
government backed up by the BSP. In 1957-58, there was a split in the civilian group 
and, the Tatmadaw penetrated into politics to fill the organisational vacuum. They 
argued that they did this to defend the interests of the state. Those who emerged as 
leaders of the Tatmadaw at this time were a small elite closely connected with the 
BSP. 
In the development of parties after Second World War, there were fifth stages in 
which the BSP was associated with the last stage which included the emergences of 
parties in Asia, South East Asia and Africa, except in India and China. At this stage, 
the parties in the Western world including Soviet Union and Japan, did not focus 
much on ideology but leaned to compromise; whereas the BSP was different based on 
ideology derived from Burma/Myanmar.19 However, the BSP learned its historical 
experiences at the third and fourth stage of party development, through socialist 
literature. Dr Robert H. Taylor remarked about the Burmese party system “Seldom 
has any party had a notable impact on government or society for more than a few 
years”.20 One exception is the BSP. The BSP that existed between 1945 and 1964 and 
was preceded from 1939 by the 'Peoples’ Revolutionary Party', the 'Burma 
Revolutionary Party', the 'Unit Party' and the 'Underground Movement'. Despite 
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lasting twenty-five years on the Burmese political scene, its ideas, policies, and 
national sentiment remained fresh and green over the four decades of involvement in 
the state and its society and continue till the current time. Such claims became evident 
from an examining of the BSP’s strengths and weaknesses in comparison with the 
INC and the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) twenty-five years before the BSP. The 
common feature of the three parties is that their emergence was based on the result of 
the social and economic conditions under colonial rule. The BSP stood for the 
“proletariat class –the peasants and workers, while the PKI represented the 
peasantry.21 In contrast, the INC did not include the class of peasants and workers and 
only when Mahatma Gandhi led the Congress in 1920 as a “mass movement” were 
the interests of the peasants and workers included. The first priority of the Congress in 
its early stage was to unite all within the nation and then asking for reforms to the 
bureaucracy run by foreigners. The BSP in a colonial state, became a dual 
organisation, both a Mass and Cadre party although it focussed on a cadre party 
because leading players of the BSP were heavily involved in the mass organisations. 
Being the total membership of party cadres was 219 in 47 branches according to the 
Headquarters list following the 1949 reorganisation.22 There was a slight increase of 
four party branches from 43 in 1946 to 47 in 1949.23 The Party was not able to show 
exact membership until 1953 because of the nature of the cadre party. However, the 
exact membership number of its mass organisations has been established (See Chapter 
Five). The membership dramatically fell when the party was split into two in 1950. In 
1956, it was reasonably estimated as near 6,000.24 Its resources came from the 
affiliated (mass) organizations such as Workers’ Asiayone, Peasants’ Asiayone, 
Women’s Asiayone, Federation of Trade Unions and Youth. From the beginning, the 
Party was a ‘cadre’ party at the centre and as ‘mass’ party in its outer circle. However, 
after 1950, it was nearly became an elite or cadre party led by U Ba Swe and U Kyaw 
Nyein although it retained the Labour Union (TUCB) links. The Party’s attachment to 
                                                 
21. "-y!folhvGwfvyfa7;(qdk&S,fvpf)ygwD/p!f;rsOf;Oya'"/7efukef/ArmhopfpmyHkEdSyfwdkuf/1946/pm=1// (The Constitution of the 
Peoples’ Freedom (Socialist) Party, Rangoon: Bamathick Press, 1946, p.1. in the Introduction.); Justus 
M. Van Der Kroef, “Lenin, Mao and Aidit”: The China Quarterly, School of Oriental and African 
Studies, 1962, p.43.  
22. ocifcspfarmif(twGif;a7;r+;=A[dk-yefvnfpnf;&Hk;a7;aumfrwD/ygwD@mecsKyf)/"(13=12=49)aehpGJtxd-yefvnfzGJhpnf;-yD;aom  
ygwDuvmyfpnf;rsm;pm7if;"?(The Report of the Party Cells List signed by Thakin Chit Maung, Secretary of 
the Central Reorganisation Committee, 13.12.1949.) 
23. Ibid.; OD;AaqG/"Arm-ynfqdk&S,fvpfvrf;n$ef"/7efukef/-ynfolhpmaywdkuf/1953/pm=30//(U Ba Swe, Guide To Socialism In 
Burma, Rangoon: Peoples' Literature House, 1953, p.30.) 
24. Saul Rose, Socialism In Southern Asia, London: Oxford University Press, 1959, p.139. 
 
 xix
the masses was becoming weaker. The Congress in the postcolonial state was also a 
dual structure with the PKI a cadre party until 1951 and from 1951 onwards it was 
increasingly becoming a mass party. Thus, the growth of party membership increased 
sharply from 7,910 at the beginning of 1952 to more than 165,000 in 1954.25 
Ideology in Burma/Myanmar can easily be over-ridden by personal loyalties. It 
can be said that in the realm of Burmese politics, as in Indonesian politics, personal 
relations are sometimes more important than ideology and when a person is loved, 
principles are revised (vludkcifawmhrludk_yifw,f/vludkrkef;awmhrludkoHk;w,f?).26 This proverb 
demonstrates an important principle of Burmese politics. The evidence could be seen 
in the AFPFL politics after regaining independence. Examples include Bo Let Yar’s 
joining (who took part in the study of Marxist and leftist literature in 1939) and 
Thakin Nu; the comparing U Ko Ko Gyi’s case with the cases of Thakin Tin and U 
Kyaw Myint Lay; the linking of Thakin Tin and Thakin Kyaw Tun with Thakin Nu; 
and the recruitment of U Ba Swe (who devoted to Marxism) and U Kyaw Nyein who 
was against Marxism. Dr Robert H. Taylor also points to the nature of politics in 
Burma/Myanmar by referring to the 1960 election which he asserts was based on a 
charismatic political elite rather than party policies.27 
The Congress had been a Centre party in comparison with the two cadre parties, 
and although it welcomed the masses in linking with state power, it took the role of  
‘compromiser’ between the rulers and masses of the country. In the freedom 
movement, the Congress approached the colonial state through Constitutional reforms 
by the British. In the 1937 election then they won eight of eleven Provinces.28 On the 
other hand, the BSP chose the revolutionary path and its strategy included founding 
the Burma National Army. In the transfer from the colonial state to the postcolonial 
state, the Congress was shaped by the colonial state, while the BSP turned the 
Government Act of 1935 upside-down working to transform the colonial state and 
rejecting membership of the British Commonwealth. The success of the Congress was 
due to a balance “…between agitational unity and the unity and stability of the 
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state…”.29 For the PKI, it diverted from the freedom struggle because of the 
circumstances of the international communist movement and thus, it was recorded in 
Indonesian history as having “stabbed the Republic in the back”.30 In the practical 
sense of foreign relations, Indonesia followed the “Neutralist Policy” like India and 
Burma, by refraining from the two power blocs led by Russia and the U.S.A, and 
creating united internal forces and defending the International Communists’ 
movements. Thus, the Indonesian postcolonial state was transformed from the old 
colonial Dutch state to a new state favouring the “Non-Alignment Policy”. In this 
domestic ground, the PKI led by Aidit in the 1950s, like the BSP led by Thakin Mya 
in the 1940s who assumed leadership of the AFPFL, used the tactic of the strategy of 
the “United National Front” to form an alliance with the nationalist figure of Sukarno 
and other progressive forces. For the party’s finances, the Congress collected its funds 
not only from its members within the wealthy class and masses, but also as a ruling 
party from business, industrial houses and private contributions.31 Both the PKI and 
the BSP had experience with securing funds illegally. In the postcolonial state, the 
BSP had recruited wealthy merchants as a major financial source, while the PKI got 
assistance from the Chinese Embassy (PRC).32 The similarity of the PKI and the BSP 
in their ideological evolution included the influences of Marxism, Leninism, 
Stalinism and Maoism, and the ideas of Marshal Tito. While accepting ideas from 
outside world, both of the two parties developed according to their own soil and 
water.33 The Congress chose the middle path of ideology, while the other two parties 
were explicitly ‘leftists’.  
In comparing the role of the army for the PKI and the BSP, the most outstanding 
feature is that the latter was support by the state army while the tense relationship 
between the army and the Communists intensified since the Madium rebellion in 
September 1948. The difficult situation between the Communist organizers and the 
military could not be found in the top elite group but at the base level of local areas - 
towns and villages. The PKI’s strategy was blocked by the Indonesian army headed 
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by the Army Chief of Staff A. H. Nasution. The army did not want to let Communists 
control the state, especially in a power-vacuum.34 Conversely, the military elite was 
involved in the formal foundation of the BSP. They supported whatever the party had 
planned and its programs in the struggle for freedom, and even proposed to stage a 
coup for the party in 1948. In the power vacuum of 1957-58 based on civilian politics, 
the party itself did not object to the army re-entering politics.     
Some authors have noted aspects of the history of the BSP and the parties that 
preceded it. Even in the writing of the BSP history itself in the era of Asian Socialists’ 
development in the 1950s, the party refrained from publicising its influential role in 
the Burmese politics, especially in the attempts to attain leftist unity but recorded it 
under personal names and some associations.35 My work will provide more details of 
how to understand socialists’ attempts to maintain national unity in the era of the Cold 
War. The party put AFPFL first in its own history—this is a source of many 
misconceptions. Moreover, the CPB, a rival to the BSP in the civil war, reviews the 
past not to consider principles but to vent personal dissatisfaction, a usual 
characteristic of Burmese politics.36  
Norman Nyun-Han, a son of Dr Ba Han, the brother of former World War Two 
Prime Minister Dr Ba Maw, submitted his PhD thesis—Burma’s Experiment in 
Socialism—to the University of Colorado in 1970. He examined socialism in Burma 
up to 1970. He presented the now conventional view of the relationship between 
socialism and politics when he stated in his thesis that "Socialism in Burma can 
therefore be said to be more or less an extension of Burmese Nationalism".37 I agree 
with his statement but it is far too simplistic. I would argue that Burmese socialism 
deserves stronger recognition as a cornerstone of nationalism. If it can be said that 
Burmese nationalism is two steps forward from patriotism, then Burmese socialism is 
one step forward from nationalism. Later Chapters will explore this judgment. In his 
account of the origins of socialism in Burma, Norman Nyun-Han argued that 
socialism was already rooted in ancient Burmese tradition. In this thesis I will follow 
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up this claim by examining ancient Burmese society and also present the case of how 
socialism was seen as a form of Pali (Sanskrit). 
Despite the value of his work, it is notable that Norman Nyun-Han mentioned 
the history of the BSP in only ten pages of one chapter. By contrast, my research 
questions his view of the party’s origins and offers evidence to counteract his 
statement that “The Burma Socialist Party (BSP) is the post-war reincarnation of the 
pre-war Burma Revolutionary Party (BRP) founded in 1939...Its founders had not 
intended to organize such a party, and it was, in fact, a creature of circumstance 
whose birth was necessitated by an unexpected emergency".38 However, as I will 
show, the emergence of the PRP came out of the efforts of patriots, including the 
student elite and the thakins, responding to the social and economic situation under 
colonialism. In the PRP's analysis, the two previous anti-colonial struggles, known as 
the Saya San Ayeidawpon (the Saya San uprising of 1930) and the 1300 Ayeidawpon 
(the peasants’, workers’ and students’ strikes of 1938-1939) had failed because of 
their lack of arms and an army, so they saw military aid from outside as a 
precondition for independence. These two events entered official national 
historiography in the late 1940s and are still commemorated as part of national 
history.39 
Further, Nyun-Han was unclear about how to represent relationships within the 
government. He argued that in 1949 the Socialists were forced to resign en bloc from 
the government because of adverse public opinion.40 There is no doubt adverse public 
opinion had been aroused because of the “40 Lakhs” case, but the resignation of the 
BSP (and the remnant PVO) was to pave the way for a settlement of the Civil War, 
especially by welcoming the CPB back into the legal fold. As I will show, there were 
many discussions among the BSP, the PVO and General Ne Win behind the scenes 
regarding the strategy of resigning and holding debates. This can be seen in the 
formation of two groups. One, led by Thakin Chit Maung (Tharrawaddy), who agreed 
with the resignation, the other, led by Bo Khin Maung Gale, who did not. U Kyaw 
Nyein was against resigning, and argued that the case had to be rethought, and at first 
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Prime Minister U Nu himself did not agree with the resignations from the BSP and 
the PVO.41 
In the analysis of the BSP's class structure, my work follows in the steps of Dr 
Robert H. Taylor in his PhD thesis, The Relationship Between Burmese Social 
Classes And British-Indian Policy On The Behaviour Of The Burmese Political Elite, 
1937-1942, submitted in 1974. In that treatise, he argued that all the Socialists in 
Burma come from the middle class.42 Robert H. Taylor supported Nyun-Han's view 
of the Burmese roots of socialism. Taylor's concentration in his writings is on the 
CPB, Thakin Soe and Thein Pe Myint. By contrast, I give more attention to Thakin 
Mya and other Socialist leaders.43 I argue, after I examined the reading lists of
nationalist leaders who later became the post-war leaders of the BSP, that they read 
rather more widely than has been usually asserted. The revolutionary Marxists and 
Leninists of the Dobama Asiayone learned their ideologies from British writers like 
John Strachey, the publications of Victor Gollancz's Left Book Club and the 
theoretician of the British Communist Party, R. Palme Dutt.
 the 
                                                
44 There is also indication 
of the reading lists of 1920s and 1930s in colonial Burma by uncovering the Nagani 
Book Club.45 
More credibility can be ascribed to views of frequent changing horses and the 
name of the BSP. I explain how the Party changed its name step-by-step: the BSP and 
then the PFP in 1945; then the BSP in 1948; then the Union of Socialist Party in 1949 
and then the BSP until 1964.  I explore the BSP’s changing in leadership as four times 
including the Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein period before the arrival of Leader Mya at 
Rangoon; Mya’s period of 1945-1947; Ko Ko Gyi’s period of July 1947- July 1948; 
and then Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein’s period until the termination of the Party in 1964. 
These name changed reflect the changing ideology and leadership in the BSP. 
However, in his article, Burma: Political Parties Of Asia And The Pacific, Dr Robert 
 
41. Unpublished notes by Thakin Hla Kyway. In the conversation, which I double checked in an 
interview with one of the participants at the meetings, Thakin Chit Maung (Tharrawaddy). 
42. Robert Henry Taylor, The Relationship Between Burmese Social Classes And British-Indian Policy 
On the Behaviour Of The Burmese Political Elite, 1937-1942, PhD thesis, Cornell University, 1974. 
43. Robert H. Taylor, Marxism And Resistance in Burma, 1942-1945: Thein Pe Myint's Wartime 
Traveler, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1984; Taylor, Robert H., The State In Burma, Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1987. 
44. Taylor, Marxism And Resistance in Burma, p.215. 
45. a':at;oDwm/"e*g;eDpmayESifhudkvdkeDacmwf-refrmhEdkifiHa7;"/a'gufwmoef;xGef;.vkyfaz:udkifzufrsm;/Armhordkif;[if;av;/ 
rEWav;wuUodkvf(ordkif;@ge)/19==/pm=174=188?(Daw Aye Thida, "Nagani Literathres and Burmese Politics in 
Colonial Period": The Colleagues of Dr Than Tun, Studies In Burmese History, Mandalay: Mandalay 
University, 19--?, pp.174-188.) Nagani means Red Dragon. This book club distributed leftist literatures 
translated from English into Burmese in 1930s.  
 
 xxiv
H. Taylor tends to overlook how changes to the BSP’s name worked step-by-step 
with changing Burmese politics. He also jumped one step ahead to the role of 
Chairman Ko Ko Gyi in the period between Thakin Mya and U Ba Swe. He wrote 
that the founders of the BSP were non-communist nationalists. I will show that the 
two founder members - U Ko Ko Gyi and Thakin Lwin came from the Communist 
environment.46 
I reveal how Thakin Mya came into the limelight among the young patriotic 
group in line with two Burmese works—Maung Ye Mya's MA thesis, An Analysis of 
the Political Role of Thakin Mya submitted in 1982, and Thakin Chit Maung 
(Waidura), one of the CEC members in the foundation of the BSP in September 1945, 
National Leader Azarni Thakin Mya published in 1979.47 
In the analysis of the Socialists’ idea in late 1930s to form an army to fight for 
independence, I point out that the national sentiment of the Burmese was in line with 
the writings of two members of the Burmese elite48, two historians from Southeast 
Asia49, and some British historians50 in which they under-estimated the native spirit 
for military service. In the published work (2000) by Parimal Ghosh, Brave Men of 
the Hills: Resistance and Rebellion in Burma, 1825-1932, there is no indication of 
linking military history to main historiography of political parties.51 
In addressing the works done by the PRP, in an examination of the collaboration 
with the fascist Japanese, to critics of the CPB and the western outlook, there is a 
focus on the BSP's insider's point of view and I develop the view that the people were 
suffering from persecution by the Japanese military police, and they supported their 
                                                 
46. Taylor, "Burma", pp.120-122. 
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1982?(Maung,Ye Mya, An Analysis of the Political Role of Thakin Mya, MA thesis, Rangoon 
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48. Maung Htin Aung, A History of Burma, New York: Columbia University Press, 1967; U Ba Than 
(Dhammika, Retired Colonel), The Roots of The Revolution, Rangoon: the Government Printing Press, 
1962. 
49. Sunait Chutintaranond & Than Tun, On Both Sides Of The Tenasserim Range: History of Siamese-
Burmese Relations, Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Phyathai: Asian Studies Monographs No. 050, 
1995. 
50. G.E Harvey, British Rule In Burma, 1824-1942, London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1946; F.S.V 
Donnison, Burma, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970.  
51. Parimal Ghosh, Brave Men of the Hills: Resistance and Rebellion in Burma, 1825-1932, Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 2000.  
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own army, the Burma Independent Army (BIA).52 Trager recorded the PRP as BRP. 
As well he pointed out that the Burmese never considered their collaboration with the 
Japanese as a moral failure but looked forward to it as a means of gaining 
independence.53 
After the emergence of the PFP in September 1945, in the periodisation of 
historiography, the Socialists suggested three periods of organising people to follow 
the party’s program. However, Josef Silverstein wrote in his book, Burmese Politics: 
The Dilemma of National Unity that there was no time limit placed on the second 
period.54 I will show the time limit Socialists referred to, in the party’s organ, The 
Socialist Front Weekly Journal.  
In the analysis of the BSP's role in the freedom movements of Burma, I argue in 
Chapter Six that the BSP had already developed friendly relationships with the ethnic 
peoples through their elite leaders, although I recognise the role of Thakin Nu in the 
Union as a leading national figure. But, Maung Maung Gyi in his PhD thesis appeared 
to ignore the real force of the relationship between the BSP and ethnic peoples.55 On 
the other hand, I support Maung Maung Gyi's writings in his PhD thesis that there 
was amongst Socialists’ a humble spirit in their works for the state rather than the 
party and perseverance to preserve the Union.56 Thompson and Adloff also over 
emphasise on the intention of the "Leftist Unity" by the BSP as party's interest.57 I 
will show their reliance on good intention to get unity among the left wingers. Mary 
P. Callahan also wrote in her book: Making Enemies: War and State Building in 
Burma, the success of the BSP and resulted from the party joining hands with its two 
mass organisations: Workers’ Asiayone and Peasants’ Asiayone, to keep loyalty to 
the AFPFL government.58 I will support her argument.  
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In her PhD thesis, The Origins of Military Rule in Burma (Cornell University, 
1996) Callahan discussed the role of the military in ruling Burma, but she was unable 
to uncover the deep relationship between military and civilian groups by connecting 
the BSP and the Tatmadaw (military) elite group.59 By contrast, my work will analyse 
the relations between these two power groups. In Callahan’s published book in 2004, 
Making Enemies, Callahan also wrote about the military history of Burma (1826-
1962), placing considerable emphasis on military-war and postcolonial state-society 
in Burma as an “empirical” result rather than the result of military ideals in the 
building of the state. I argue in Chapter Eight that the socialist military elite group 
started their ideology, in coincidence with the emergence of the BSP in 1945 and 
passed through until 1949 and then, in 1957-58 they prepared to review the 1947 
Constitution for the 1962 Socialist Revolution and trained leading cadres since 1958.   
Moreover, Mary Callahan gave little weight to the success of civil society with 
the neutralism of Burma and the BSP role in Asian Socialist movements which started 
in 1952. By contrast, she covers the military history during the period from 1950 to 
1962. I fill this gap in Chapter Seven with outlining the BSP's success. The current 
military articles included in the newspaper, The New Light Of Myanmar are also 
contradicted because the military government failed to mention the role of the civilian 
Prime Minister and the role of BSP at that time when they praised the Bandung spirit 
and attended the Commemoration of the Golden Jubilee of the Asian-African 
Conference 1955. When they made a friendship relationship with the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), the five principles of peaceful coexistence were also 
revealed.60 It is notable that the current military regime is copying the heritage of the 
BSP and its shell. 
Some scholars might argue that the military involvement was just support from 
Tatmadaw that produced the reincarnation of the PRP, the PFP in 1945.61 Yet such a 
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view acknowledges Tatmadaw’s deep involvement in the foundation of the PFP and 
then the BSP, and does not compare the role of the PRP to the strategy of the CPB, as 
I do in Chapter Two. I also show in Chapter Six how the Tatmadaw men gave strong 
support to the party and how they created mutual understanding between the BSP and 
Tatmadaw men was achieved in the period 1945-57. Mary Callahan draws on Nay 
Nyunt's thesis but this is misleading because it conforms to official historiography 
which elides essential elements. I have already mentioned the shortcomings of my 
own thesis on the PFP, while another MA thesis from Rangoon University, by Pa Pa 
Oo, is limited in its scope and in its access to sources. Neither can answer the key 
questions posed in the present dissertation about the relationship of the BSP to the 
state.62 
In the last book written by former President Dr Maung Maung, a biographer of 
U Ne Win, the author devotes only one sentence to the close relationship between the 
Socialists and the Prime Minister in the Nu period.63 There was only one further 
sentence explaining the Army’s deep involvement in the politics and administration of 
the country from the very early years after independence.64 It may be assumed that he 
knew what had happened, but was perhaps constrained by the situation of writing and 
could only provide hints for other researchers. 
In contrast claims were made on the basis of the forty-one pages written by 
former BSP Joint Secretary, Bo Aung Gyi, who said that Bo Tin Pe, Bo Than Sein 
and Bo Kyaw Soe had little knowledge of socialist ideology and that they studied 
only the notes used by U Ko Ko Gyi for his seven-day socialist ideology course held 
in 1945 when the BSP (Peoples’ Freedom (Socialist) Party) was first founded.65  
In writing the history of Tatmadaw in 1995, there are two reasons for the coup 
in 1962 by the military revolutionary group: the Shan Federalism and the Socialist 
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Construction.66 My argument in Chapter Eight is leaning towards an ideological point 
of view rather than ethnic Shan problem. It provides new information about how 
Burmese authoritarianism gradually developed in Burma after the Second World War. 
An article in the 'New Light of Myanmar' during the SLORC period in 1992, 
exemplifies the failure to recognise the combined role of the BSP and the Tatmadaw 
in fighting colonialism. In this article, Tat’s role is described as the main force behind 
Burma's aid to Vietnam. In fact, the BSP saw itself as fulfilling the desires of the 
assassinated national heroes. In the period of the BSPP (1962-1988), when cadres 
from the BSPP visited these countries on official visits, the host countries proclaimed 
thanks for this assistance. At that time, the cadres didn't know how to respond, 
because the relations the BSP had established with Vietnam were not acknowledged 
in the history of the BSP and the Tatmadaw. When the former General Secretary of 
the BSP, U Ba Swe, heard that news, he remarked, "They don't know who is their real 
father". 
The reason that these relations had not been made public, was that within the 
BSP in 1947-48, the social democrat group considered assistance to Vietnam and 
Indonesia as leaning to the communist groups and therefore kept it secret, although U 
Kyaw Nyein had mentioned the help given to the Viet Minh at the Asia Socialist 
Conference.67 Nevertheless, the aid given to Indonesia became the basis for an 
historical friendship, which is explained in Chapter Seven.68 Within the BSP, the 
Cold War was already beginning to have a strong effect, and this effect was to cloud
the internal ideological formulations of the party, as revealed in its own historical 
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Herodotus, to cross-question and cross-examine eye-witnesses.69 Both my Burmese 
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odology 
In writing this dissertation, I have used the method of the Greek historian 
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and Australian teachers urged me to re-examine the information and opinions from 
the interviews for bias.70 For those reasons I began with the autobiographical account 
of former BSP Chairman U Ko Ko Gyi, the unpublished documents by Thakin Hla 
Kyway, the Diary of Thakin Hla Kyway, and the primary sources from Thakin Hla 
Kyway’s library. The interviews with my grandfather, a leading figures such as 
former Brigadier Tin Pe, and others who played important roles in the BSP and 
related groups, were then supplemented with a variety of primary sources, in 
particular archives in London and the sources collected by International Institute for 
Social History (IISG), Amsterdam.  
I have kept my promises that I would only reveal information from some 
interviewees after they died, and to only use some of the material revealed to me as 
unsourced background material, just as a number of the interviewees requested.71 As I 
mentioned previously, some of my material was obtained on the assumption by others 
that my grandfather had already told me about these matters. I got the unpublished 
notes of Thakin Hla Kyway very early in my research, and I would like to have asked 
my grandfather many more questions that arose from them, but sadly his death 
prevented this. Some of the ex-politicians whom I interviewed requested that what 
they told me should only be revealed after their deaths, so I could not use their 
material in my MA thesis, although I am able to do so now. One of them, former 
Brigadier Tin Pe, who had helped General Ne Win organise the 1962 coup that 
brought the government preceding the BSPP to power, insisted on dictating his 
account. Former Brigadier Aung Gyi72 said that he did not want the history of the 
BSP to be uncovered while U Ne Win was still alive, but he arranged an interview 
with U Kyaw Myint Lay, one of the founders in the BSP.73 I was also able to 
                                                                                                                                           
Department of Classics, Stanford University, Anma Libri & Co., 1985, pp.47-48. Herodotus was born 
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Former Colonel Ba Than).  
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interview other ex-politicians, cross-questioning each in relation to other accou
and against contemporary newspapers and books. I am in the fortunate position of 
being able to draw on both Burmese and English sources. I also read unedited 
interviews plus help additional conversations from Burmese politicians. Theref
the method used in this thesis is the fruitful result of examining the triangular 
relationship between interviews, primary documents from private and Library 
collections and historical
nts, 
ore, 
 evidence from newspapers and journals. However, I remind 
all readers that they should be sceptical about my work, as I remain faithful to 
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l era.74 One element that needs to be added to the picture of the social 
backg er 
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h by 
                                                
Herodotus’s method.      
 
Summary of Chapters 
My thesis concentrates on the decades between the 1930s and 1964. Chapter 
One aims at providing an understanding of why the Burmese revolutionaries created
an underground party, one of the pre-conditions for understanding what led to the 
creation of the Socialist Party of Burma or BSP. Once a party had been created, the 
next question is, who should lead it? Thus I look at the emergence of the pre-wa
political leaders, who were also to lead the country in the post-war period. But this 
analysis does not tell us “why socialism”, so I have analysed why the Burmese 
nationalist movement took a socialist form. In doing this I have drawn on previous 
literature that exists in a relatively scattered form on the subject. My study shows that 
the Nationalist movement adopted Socialist forms because of the class composition of 
Burma, in particular because of the class backgrounds of the leadership, an issue tha
has been partly examined by Robert H. Taylor in his study of Burmese political elites 
in the colonia
round that produced the BSP is the importance of Tats or military groups und
colonialism. 
Chapter Two is concerned with the emergence of the underground party, the 
PRP, and its reincarnation as the Peoples’ Freedom (Socialist) Party after World 
Two. I look at impact of the war on the former student leaders and those known as the 
Thakins. There are significant differences that emerged at that time between the 
Communists and other revolutionary groups. Such differences were produced bot
ideology and by strategic views on whether it was more important to fight colonialism 
or fascism at that time. One of the key differences lay in the CPB’s emphasis on 
 
74. Taylor, op.cit.. 
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ideology, as opposed to the PRP/PFP group who argued that support from the masses,
peasants and workers, had not been enough to defeat British imperialism, withou
essential element of arms. The young patriotic men known later as PRP, founded the 
Burma Freedom Bloc legally and, simultaneously they formed the underground 
Burma Revolutionary Party or Peoples’ Revolutionary Party in order to obtain foreig
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e Win. 
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 and then 1950. These splits have to be seen 
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pter 
s account, there is a need to glean from diverse sources such as the 
prima
 
 the 
ry assistance. They found it from the Japanese, and so from the latter group 
became the Thirty Heroes, who included Bogyoke Aung San and Bogyoke N
The key players and followers of the PFP/BSP are discussed in Chapter Three
In this account, the builders of the party, military and civilian personnel are 
categorised to get a clear image of the Party’s composition, although some of them 
were involved in both roles. The party’s c
ement of women are also analysed because of their significance in the freedom 
movements and the State’s construction. 
Chapter Four examines the writing of the constitution of the PFP/BSP, and the 
structure, organisation and funding of the PRP/PFP/BSP. In so doing, I compare it 
with the characteristics of the Socialist Party (India). I will ask: what elements gav
rise to conflict within Burmese socialism and, what are the legacies of the BSP in the 
past? The 1947 Constitution was important to the BSP because of its advocacy of 
social revolution. Therefore, Chapter Five will examine the BSP’s implementation of
socialism in the economic and social fields. This chapter will look at factors in the 
formation of the BSP that led to continuing ideological differences within the party, 
especially in relation to the splits of 1948
 light of different attitudes towards Burma’s Civil War and then the maintena
of democratic government in the 1950s. 
The reflections of the BSP’s policies are still evident in Burmese/Myanmar 
politics and thus, the strategies and tactics for both internal and external relations
of Burma, are revealed in Chapter Five, which will be connect to chains in Cha
Seven. In thi
ry speeches by key players, the BSP’s documentary books, and valuable 
interviews. 
Chapter Six then evaluates the role of the PFP and its successor, the BSP, in
Burmese politics between 1945 and 1962. This chapter looks at the party’s role in
national front, the AFPFL, during the struggle for independence, and then in the 
subsequent struggle for national unity. The AFPFL was not a party proper, but a 
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national front, as the name implies. From the need to provide national unity derived 
the BSP strategies to organise and mobilise over 135 ethnic groups of Burma. I will
also examine the party’s attitude to the ethnic question. The AFPFL could not contain
the differences between the CPB and the BSP. It was the split of the CPB into tw
communist parties 
 
 
o 
(the Red Flags and the White Flags) and their expulsion from the 
AFPF
s of 
, 
o 
ne 
d armed struggle.75 Sources disagree as to whether these internal struggles 
were ders in 
 internal effects on the BSP, 
and th ism 
. The 
                                                
L, that gave the opportunity for the BSP to emerge on the centre stage of 
Burmese politics. 
However, there were still other significant differences among the member
the AFPFL in the struggle for independence, particularly over the role of armed 
struggle during World War Two. The CPB at the time followed the strategy of 
Browderism, which meant that they urged the Socialists, who were still hiding arms 
for a revolution against the British, to hand over all the arms to the Allied army. Later
under the leadership of Thakin Mya, not only the AFPFL but also the BSP shifted t
the path of negotiation by entering into the Governor Council, attending the London 
talks for independence, and holding the April Election and Constituent Assembly. 
But, at the same time, they had prepared a contingency plan if negotiations failed, o
that involve
connected to the assassination of Bogyoke Aung San and the other lea
July 1947. 
Chapter Seven reveals that a significant element of the BSP’s role in 
government was its international role. This has not previously been carefully 
examined in the secondary literature. Independent Burma played a key role in the 
Cold War, not because of the strength of its communist parties, but because of its 
leadership in the Asia Socialist group, leading to the attempt to break away from the 
two power blocs that dominated international politics, in the form of the Asia-Africa 
or Third World movement. The Cold War, however, had
ese led to a division in the Party. This grew out of U Nu’s rejection of Marx
within the AFPFL, which came to factionalise the BSP. 
This factionalism led to the Coups of 1958 and 1962, as I will show in my 
examination of the role of the Tatmadaw (Military) in the BSP, in Chapter Eight
future military leadership of Burma had been involved in the formation of the BSP 
since the days of the PRP. During the resistance to the Japanese, a clique of the 
 
75. Myawaddi U Ye Gaung, who was involved in the hiding of arms, has circulated documents 
publicly amongst the Burmese community in Australia concerning this matter. 
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Tatmadaw within the PRP evolved. Members of this same group were main players in 
the foundation of the PFP and then the BSP, although they were still in the army a
so were not publicly members of the Party. This Tatmadaw group argued that it had 
serve the state in the Civil War by joining together with the BSP. The Tatmadaw 
regarded the split of the AFPFL in 1958 as a power vacuum and thus staged a coup
apparently sanctioned by the Prime Minister, U Nu. Some members of the 1958 Coup
group in the Tat
nd 
to 
 
 
madaw remained linked to the BSP, and they split from the other 
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not 
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stifying this thesis as 
 seeks to thoroughly investigate just how central the BSP and its historical 
antecedents, have been in shaping modern Myanmar’s history.  
 
ry faction in 1961 over ideological matters. This split may have made the 196
Coup possible. 
There were obviously many things going on behind the scenes that have 
been previously identified as important. Also, there is a significant gap in the curren
literature about the BSP. By revealing these aspects of the history of the BSP, 
important lessons could be learned about the heritage and formation of present-day 
Burmese politics. Key questions that emerge from these events about the party, 
relevant to understanding the present-day political situation are: what precisely was 
their role in the independence movement? How did they develop their relationship 
with Burma’s ruling Tatmadaw? Why has information about that relationship been 
suppressed? In order to answer these questions, I examine how the party was for
as the BSP after independence, and in what ways they continued pre-independe
organisation and ideas. The “40 Lakhs case” shows that funding was obviously 
important, but just as important was the effect of the Cold War upon the BSP, 
considering that it initiated the Asia Socialist Movement. These questions and issues 
appear not to have been addressed in a satisfactory way in any of the existing
literature, either in Burmese or English. By addressing them, I ju
it
 
